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Wisconsin’s reform of family welfare is the most radical and, arguably, the most successful in
the nation. This is not due to anything special about the welfare problem or public opinion in the state but
rather to special features of the state’s politics and government. Reform is radical, but at the same time it
has been largely bipartisan, with most Democrats joining with Governor Tommy Thompson and other
Republicans in seeking to transform the system. Bipartisanship, in turn, reflects the unusual moderation
of Republicans in approaching reform and the unusual willingness of Democrats to criticize the old
system. Outside groups—such as black leaders, welfare advocates, and academics, who elsewhere block
reform—have been moderate or ineffective in their protests, while business has been unusually
supportive. Two background conditions have helped shape this political environment—Wisconsin’s
cohesive society and its masterful government, the product of its Progressive past. In Wisconsin, in
contrast to other urban states, both the will to reform welfare and the capacity to do so are strong.Statecraft:
The Politics of Welfare Reform in Wisconsin
In the last decade, Wisconsin has instituted the most radical welfare reform in the nation.
“Welfare” here means Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), the principal federal-state
program for needy families. Congress created TANF in 1996, when the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) abolished the earlier family welfare program, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), that had been the object of controversy for over 30 years.
Under TANF, states have enhanced control over welfare policy, but they must also institute demanding
new work requirements for adult recipients. Families can draw aid for only 5 years. Even before
PRWORA, however, Wisconsin had enforced work in welfare with special stringency. It also enacted a
new, all-work-based aid system, and it is still the only state to do so.
My question is how Wisconsin managed to do this. In my understanding, public policy as a field
within political science should use policy success or failure to reveal fresh insights about government.
1
Welfare reform poses a tough problem for government. It was evident as early as the 1960s that the
failure of most welfare adults to work was a major reason for dependency. Yet neither Washington nor
state governments have found it easy to require work in welfare. Assistance usually remained an
entitlement. That is, it was given to people on grounds of need, with little self-reliance expected of them
in return. In earlier writings, I attributed that failure to American government’s reluctance to obligate
individuals or to admit their incapacities, among other problems.
2
But Wisconsin has enforced work in welfare, so the question shifts: What features of this
government allowed it to succeed where others have failed? My answer is that Wisconsin possesses an
exemplary political process and a talented bureaucracy. In this paper I summarize the political side of
that argument.
3 The question is: Why were Wisconsin’s politicians able to agree on such a radical
reform?2
ASSUMPTIONS
In approaching this problem, I make these assumptions, which I cannot justify fully here:
The Wisconsin reform is real. Not every initiative announced by a governor, or even enacted by a
legislature, represents an actual change in policy. The history of welfare is rife with state-level “reforms”
that never got beyond press releases; or if they were enacted, they did not receive waivers from
Washington (before PRWORA, experiments usually required federal permission) or were not
implemented by the bureaucracy.
4 Wisconsin’s reform, however, appears to have been fully implemented
over a period of more than 10 years. According to fieldwork and analyses of program data, local welfare
operations had already changed by the mid-1990s to require work of many more welfare adults than usual
in the U.S.
5 The new Wisconsin welfare system, called Wisconsin Works, or W-2, requires all parents of
aided families to work at some level. Although many states talk about welfare reform, Wisconsin has
produced. The state is not distinctive in what politicians say about welfare, but rather in its capacity to
deliver change “on the ground.”
The reform is a success. There are several reasons to regard the Wisconsin reform as successful.
First, it embodies what has been learned from past efforts at reform—the best approach to reform is to
promote work among the adult recipients. Raising work levels addresses the immediate cause of most
poverty among the working-aged—a lack of sustained employment. The most successful work programs
have two critical features. First, they are mandatory, not voluntary, and enforce participation stringently.
Second, they require that most participants actually work or look for work in available jobs, in preference
to obtaining education or training for better positions.
6 The reformed Wisconsin system institutionalizes
both policies.
A second reason to regard the Wisconsin reform as successful is that the consequences of reform
to date appear to have been favorable. Participation and work levels among recipients have increased
sharply while the caseload has fallen dramatically. Only 13,342 families received cash aid in Wisconsin3
in March 1998, a decline of 86 percent since January 1987.
7 The full consequences for families are still
unclear; surveys and other research to track the effects of reform in this and other states are still
incomplete. However, remarkably little evidence points to hardship, such as increases in homelessness or
children forced to go into foster care because families were destitute. Observers report an encouraging
increase in work levels and income in some poor sections of Milwaukee.
8
Success is unusual. The Wisconsin story would not draw attention if it were common, but it is
not. No state has matched Wisconsin’s dramatic fall in dependency. Between 1987 and 1995, AFDC fell
27 percent in Wisconsin, or 9 points more than in the next-best state (Mississippi).
9 In the last several
years, several rural states with small caseloads have outpaced the Wisconsin decline in percentage terms,
but no urban state has done so. Most large states are still reversing the sharp run-up in dependency that
occurred between 1989 and 1994, when the national caseload jumped 30 percent. Wisconsin, which
avoided that increase, has taken welfare down to levels not seen since before AFDC became a national
issue in the 1960s.
Currently, to be sure, welfare caseloads are falling dramatically across the country, and this has
allowed many states to claim credit for reforming welfare. But expert observers think the declines are
driven mostly by a good economy and by a political dynamic triggered by PRWORA. Jobs are available,
and needy people are hearing so much talk of work requirements that many are leaving the rolls
spontaneously or not going on them even though they might be eligible.
10 It is doubtful how much the
current decline reflects actual, implemented changes in welfare policy.
Also, no state has transformed welfare as radically as Wisconsin. Not only is W-2 totally work-
based, but it has other features not found in other states. It pays the same grant to all families regardless
of size, pays all child support directly to welfare families rather than reimbursing welfare, and subsidizes
health and child care for all working poor, on or off welfare.
11 According to a federal report, “Wisconsin
provides the most dramatic example of how the traditional service and benefit delivery structure can be4
changed to transform welfare into a work-based system.”
12 In addition, Wisconsin’s welfare bureaucracy
has been reinvented through wide use of private contractors to deliver services, including the total
privatization of welfare administration in Milwaukee, site of most of the state’s remaining welfare cases.
Wisconsin’s welfare record is unique. Thus, the reasons for the success become interesting and
important.
DETERMINING THE REASONS
Why should we trace this success to government at all? In the past, academic observers have
attributed Wisconsin’s welfare decline, like that of the nation currently, to unusually good economic
conditions and reductions in welfare benefit levels, which render fewer families eligible for aid. It is true
that Wisconsin has enjoyed below-average unemployment in recent years, and that benefits, after a cut in
1987, were not raised in nominal terms for 10 years, allowing them to fall further with inflation.
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However, many other states had equally good economies and allowed benefits to fall, without recording
the same reductions in dependency. Statistical analysis of the Wisconsin fall suggests that it is due partly
to economic conditions but also to the enforcement of work by the state’s new welfare policies.
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Another argument is that it is easy to reform welfare in Wisconsin because it is a small state with
few blacks and Hispanics, the groups most seriously dependent on welfare. Actually, Wisconsin’s
population of 5 million is about average for the states, and in 1993, 31 percent of its welfare recipients
were black, not far below the 36 percent figure for the nation in 1994. Although Wisconsin has few
Hispanics on welfare, it has more Asians and Native Americans than the norm. The white proportion
among recipients was 47 percent, compared to 37 percent for the nation.
15 Since 1994, the continuing fall
in the rolls, which is greatest among whites, has made the remaining recipients even more heavily
nonwhite. Nor does Wisconsin escape the problems of urban America. Milwaukee, where most of the
remaining cases are concentrated, is heavily black and Hispanic. According to a recent study, it is one of5
the most segregated and depressed cities in America.
16 Yet welfare decline has been dramatic even in
Milwaukee.
In short, favorable social and economic conditions alone cannot explain Wisconsin’s welfare
success. The state’s secret must lie somewhere within politics or government. One might suspect that the
Wisconsin public is especially insistent about reforming welfare. It is true that polls in the state reveal a
strong fear that high benefits are attracting poor people from other states, and a still more intense desire
to change welfare lifestyle. Majorities of 80 percent or more favor tougher child support enforcement and
requiring recipients to work and keep their children in school, on pain of reductions in their grants.
17 But
in this Wisconsinites are no different from voters in other states, most of whom want the same kind of
reforms.
18 What stands out about Wisconsin is not the shape of opinion but the fact that government here,
more than anywhere else, has actually changed welfare in the way the public wants.
In explaining that, the performance of government itself is critical. Reforming welfare by
changing lifestyle is difficult. It is not enough to give or deny aid as such. Rather, one must combine aid
with functioning requirements so that the recipients work and fulfill other social expectations (such as
getting through school and obeying the law) in return for support. The system must be both generous and
demanding toward the recipients. In this sense, it must become paternalist.
19 To accomplish this,
legislators have to enact the required policies, and then administrators have to execute them, a complex
undertaking. If most states have not done that, it is chiefly because government has been unequal to these
tasks, for two main reasons.
First, politicians are usually more polarized about welfare than is the public. Typically, liberals
want to be generous toward the poor, conservatives demanding, but not both at once. One side will not
countenance serious work obligations for the dependent; the other will not pay for the bureaucracy and
child care needed to enforce work. Until PRWORA, that impasse prevented decisive change at the
national level.
20 Traditionally, some important states, notably New York and California, have passed6
merely cosmetic reforms, or they have delegated the tough decisions about change to their counties, a
habit that continues under PRWORA.
The second big problem is administrative. The welfare bureaucracy in many states is simply
unequal to grafting a serious work mission onto the aid operation. To do that requires continuing to aid
families while at the same time inducting them into job search and other activities meant to promote
independence. In most big cities, work activities remain largely peripheral to income maintenance, a fact
masked by the current caseload decline.
I hypothesize that Wisconsin has succeeded with reform mainly because government is more
capable there than in most states. That is, the politicians could agree on reform and the bureaucracy could
execute it. I deal in this paper with the political side of that story. The question is why Wisconsin’s
parties were able to agree not only on change but on a radical reform that exceeded what either of them
had previously contemplated. The reasons, I argue, are partly that the parties are more collaborative than
they seem to be in other urban states and partly that they draw upon a special political culture that
stresses both social obligations and problem-solving. My sources include other studies of the Wisconsin
reform, interviews with legislators and administrators who played a key role in reform, and reviews of
news stories about the politics of reform.
21
Is good government also the key to welfare reform in other states? It is difficult to generalize
from a single case study. Methodologists advise researchers that they cannot draw much inference about
causes unless they examine a wide range of variation in both their dependent and explanatory terms.
22 I
cannot offer such a range here. Wisconsin is clearly an outlier among the states in terms of both welfare
reform and governmental quality. I will deal with this problem to a limited extent by drawing on the
secondary literature on state-level welfare reform. Existing studies of other states, though less thorough
than this one, are enough to sustain the general association between government quality and successful
reform. That is, I do not know of another substantial, implemented reform produced in another state7
without conspicuously good government, and I also do not know of a conspicuously well-governed state
that has seriously tried to change welfare and failed. However, most of those other states, for instance
Iowa, Utah, and Oregon, are smaller and less urban than Wisconsin, and their reforms are less
thoroughgoing.
I am less concerned about establishing causality beyond doubt than about dramatizing the
manner of the Wisconsin reform. In this state we witness state-building in operation—a democratic
government facing its challenges and elaborating its structures to solve a major public problem. This is
how the public in every state wants government to address social problems.
In the sections that follow, I briefly summarize the Wisconsin reform and then argue that
conventional political explanations are insufficient. It is not enough to say that a welfare crisis arose and
that Tommy Thompson, the state’s reforming governor, capitalized on it, defeating his opponents. One
also has to explain why the parties could agree on change, and indeed on radical change. I show that the
Republicans have been surprisingly progovernment and Democrats surprisingly willing to criticize the
old welfare system, to the point where reform was substantially bipartisan. Also, outside groups have not
blocked reform. Further, I link these features to Wisconsin’s social makeup and its Progressive past,
forces that have given it a conservative social ethos but an ambitious and masterful government. I close
with a few comments on the timing of the reform.
WISCONSIN’S WELFARE REFORM
In the 1970s and early 1980s, Wisconsin built up one of the most generous welfare systems in the
United States AFDC grant levels were increased regularly, and by 1987, when Tommy Thompson
became governor, they were the fifth highest in the nation.
23 Reforms to stem dependency began early but
had little effect. The Work Incentive (WIN) program was the first national program intended to put8
AFDC recipients to work, and Wisconsin ran it unusually well. In the early 1980s, the state was also a
pioneer in improving the collection of child support.
But dependency kept growing. The AFDC rolls crested at over 300,000 persons in 1985–86. The
burden of general assistance, a locally funded aid program largely for single adults, also grew. The state
suddenly awoke to its problem. After Tommy Thompson became governor in 1987, he initially trimmed
welfare benefit levels. He instituted Learnfare, a requirement that teenage welfare recipients stay in
school on pain of grant reductions, and Children First, an experimental child support enforcement
program. In subsequent years, he added several more experiments intended to cut dependency, such as
enhanced work incentives, so that recipients lost less welfare if they worked; Two-Tier, which paid
incoming welfare recipients less than Wisconsin citizens at first if they came from a state paying less;
and Parental and Family Responsibility (“Bridefare”), a set of incentives to deter parental breakup among
the poor. Most of these programs required waivers of normal federal rules from Washington. All the
while, the state built up welfare work requirements in AFDC. Work programs reached more and more of
the caseload, and by the early 1990s they emphasized work in immediate jobs, rather than education and
training.
A more radical phase of reform began in 1993, when the state enacted Work Not Welfare
(WNW). This was an experiment in which families were limited to 2 years of cash aid, and they had to
work for it by discharging specified activities. In 1994 came Work First, an attempt to divert applicants
for aid from welfare by arranging some other means of support, often a job or help from families. Other
than Learnfare, the experiments were instituted initially only in selected counties, usually outside
Milwaukee. But in March 1996, the demands to look for work in advance of aid and to earn one’s grant
with activities were extended to the entire state through Self-Sufficiency First (SSF) and Pay for
Performance (PFP). Finally, in September 1997, the state instituted W-2, in which all adult recipients9
must work at some level. Spells of aid under W-2 are generally limited to 2 years, and no family can get
assistance for a total of more than 5 years.
Except for a brief uptick in 1991, during the national recession, the AFDC caseload fell
continuously throughout the reform period. It seems to have been driven down mostly by good economic
conditions in the late 1980s, then by toughening welfare work policies in the early 1990s, finally by
diversion after 1994.
24 Many expected that the decline would abate after the most employable clients
were placed and only the harder-to-serve remained. But SSF and PFP led to wholesale departures from
the rolls and a sharp fall in new applications for aid, trends that continued with the implementation of
W-2. Today, cash welfare is a shadow of its former self, although in-kind caseloads (for food stamps and
Medicaid) have fallen less dramatically. Due to the expense of administration and support services such
as child care, the state is spending more per case than before reform. Yet because of the caseload
collapse, welfare spending is still dramatically lower than before Tommy Thompson took office.
25
A CONVENTIONAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS
One might explain the Wisconsin reform simply by saying that the state followed the political
drift of most of the nation to the right since the 1960s. Traditionally, Wisconsin was a liberal state. In the
postwar era, the two parties traded control of the governorship and federal offices regularly, but
Democrats controlled the state legislature continuously from the mid-1970s until 1993.
26 Democrats were
chiefly responsible for the state’s generous prereform welfare system. Following Tommy Thompson’s
election as governor in 1986, however, Republicans rebuilt their strength in the legislature, and this
unnerved their opponents. With Ronald Reagan in the White House, national welfare policy had already
turned conservative, and liberal policymakers in Madison were worried.
Reform first became an active issue in the mid-1980s, due to “welfare migration.” Local officials
noticed that many new applicants signing up for welfare seemed to be recent migrants from nearby states10
that paid lower benefits—in particular from Chicago. Joseph Andrea, a Democratic state senator from
Kenosha, the county closest to Chicago, blamed the problem on the state’s overgenerous benefits and
lack of serious work requirements. The cry was taken up by other blue-collar Democrats from Milwaukee
and Racine. Later, in 1992, David Prosser, the Republican leader in the Assembly, produced evidence
that some Chicagoans were coming to Milwaukee just to collect welfare checks by posing as
residents—and then taking the money back to Chicago.
27
These stories of fraud and abuse fatally undercut Wisconsin’s liberal welfare consensus. The
migration issue painted Wisconsinites as suckers who were being exploited by their less-civic neighbors.
Governor Tony Earl, a liberal Democrat elected in 1982, had raised welfare benefits in alliance with the
liberal legislature, as the government had been doing for years. The migration furor blindsided him. He
commissioned a study by the state university, which showed that few poor migrants came to Wisconsin
specifically for higher welfare. A string of later studies showed the same or equivocal results.
28 But the
controversy refused to die, and Earl never recovered. There was no way he could satisfy his liberal
political base—poor voters and advocate groups committed to welfare—while at the same time
responding to an enraged public.
29
Tommy Thompson capitalized on the welfare issue, among others, to unseat Earl in the 1986
election. He then used welfare to keep the initiative. He and his advisers launched one reform
“experiment” after another. Democrats perpetually had to react to his agenda rather than advancing their
own. Key members of Thompson’s team were James Klauser, a longtime aide whom Thompson made
Secretary of Administration, and Gerald Whitburn, who was Secretary of the Department of Health and
Social Services (HSS) from 1991 to 1995. According to Whitburn, the earlier reforms, successful or not,
“set the table” for W-2, because they drove Democrats into a corner where they had no choice but to
accept radical reform. Although Thompson pursued other changes in state government, welfare was the11
subject where he had his rivals on the run. His relentless focus on it accounts for much of his success.
30
Press accounts of the Wisconsin reform consistently laud his leadership.
31
Democrats found Thompson hard to answer. They compromised with the governor in self-
protective ways, and this prevented them from opposing him effectively. When first elected in 1987,
Thompson persuaded Tim Cullen, the influential Democratic majority leader of the Senate, to become his
Secretary of HSS, the department in charge of welfare reform. That removed Cullen as a potential
gubernatorial rival. It also made Tom Loftus, Speaker of the Assembly, the presumptive challenger to
Thompson and forced him to trim his liberal sails to appeal to a statewide electorate. In 1990, Loftus did
run against Thompson and was defeated soundly.
By this point, many Democrats found it easier to support Thompson’s schemes than to oppose
them. Representative Margaret Krusick, a Democrat from Milwaukee, remarked in 1991 that “If
lawmakers are responsive to their constituents, they will vote for welfare reform.” Indeed, for Democrats
not “to be in the forefront of welfare reform” would be to “risk . . . losing their seats in the Legislature.”
32
Democrats could not assemble a coalition against Thompson. The defense of welfare drew its strongest
support from liberal legislators from the Madison area and from liberal advocate groups in Madison and
Milwaukee. Neither element could deliver many votes. As for the recipients and minority groups reliant
on welfare, their voting turnout was too low to give them leverage. It might seem inevitable that the
Republicans eventually gained a majority in the legislature in 1993–94 and went on to enact the radical
W-2, undoing the liberal welfare system.
WAS REFORM PARTISAN?
This conventional interpretation of the process leading to Wisconsin’s welfare reform is not
wrong, but it is incomplete. It presumes that welfare was a partisan matter. That is, reform was
conservative, and if it was to prevail, Republicans had to outmaneuver Democrats. On this view, the12
outcome should have been a messy compromise that satisfied neither party, or it could have been an
outright Republican victory. At the federal level, the Family Support Act of 1988 was an example of
messy compromise, since it expanded welfare benefits while also toughening work requirements.
PRWORA was an example of conservative victory, since it was an unabashedly conservative measure
that President Clinton signed only reluctantly.
In Wisconsin, welfare in the past had been partisan. When Republicans in the Assembly first
forced through cuts in welfare benefits in 1969, they did so to save money, and their rhetoric questioned
the very legitimacy of aid. Democrats fought the cuts, and radical priests led welfare recipients from
Milwaukee in marches on Madison. The episode galvanized the liberal constituency behind welfare as
never before. Churches, advocates, Democratic politicians, even unions united to defend a generous
welfare policy against unreasoning reaction. This helps explain why the indulgent, undemanding
character of that system went unquestioned for so long.
33 At this point, both parties were entrenched in
positions where they favored or opposed big government as such—the very polarization that long
prevented fundamental change in Washington.
That sort of estrangement lingered into the Thompson era. There were moments, especially early
on in Thompson’s quest, when Democratic leaders such as Tom Loftus announced that they had
“irreconcilable differences” with him over welfare.
34 Thompson himself averred that his leading
opponents were committed liberals who opposed him root and branch. In the early years, they allowed
him only “limited experiments.”
35 Indeed, they defeated or delayed many of his early proposals, and he
was able to force through his benefit cut and Learnfare in 1987 only through aggressive use of his partial
veto. He wielded this power, in effect, to rewrite the state budget, which contained many of his programs,
by expanding the benefit cut and toughening Learnfare far beyond what the legislature had authorized.
Democrats were outraged. They fought in vain to overturn the vetoes, first in the legislature and then in
the courts.13
If we accept a partisan interpretation, the parties do not collaborate, and election outcomes
become critical because they determine which party can coerce the other. Thompson’s defeat of Earl in
1986 was fundamental to change, because Earl defended entitlement, or aid without work tests, while
Thompson rejected it. Also, it was critical that Republicans regained their legislative majority in
1993–94, after years in the wilderness, because this allowed them to enact the more radical phase of
reform. With Democrats in charge, W-2 would certainly have been more moderate, providing more aid to
the employable and allowing more education and training in place of work. Indeed, when Democrats
recovered control of the Senate in 1996, they tried to liberalize Thompson’s system by abolishing
Learnfare and paying wages rather than welfare grants to W-2 clients in community service jobs.
Thompson had to beat back some of these attempts with further vetoes.
36
The trouble with this account, however, is that it cannot explain how much Thompson achieved.
Most of the time since 1987, he has had to work with a legislature where his opponents controlled at least
one house, and usually both of them. Despite all the static, Democrats collaborated with Thompson on
reform more than they fought him. The very Democratic leaders who the governor said opposed him
agreed to join a bipartisan Welfare Reform Commission set up by Thompson in early 1987. Chaired by
HSS Secretary Tim Cullen and including all four legislative party leaders, this body approved most of the
initial planks in Thompson’s program, although not the benefit cut.
37
Many, even most, Democratic legislators ended up voting for Thompson’s proposals. A number
of Democrats even signed up as cosponsors of the radical Work Not Welfare, and the great majority of
representatives and senators from both parties voted for it.
38 The final vote in the Assembly was 73–25 in
favor of W-2, with 22 of 47 Democrats in the majority; in the Senate, the vote was 27–6, with 10 of 16
Democrats in favor.
39 Even the few Democratic liberals who voted against W-2 admitted that much of
Thompson’s support came from their own party.
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Nor did collaboration imply that Democrats were simply intimidated. The outcome was not a
messy compromise, nor was it a clear-cut victory for the conservatives. W-2 did end entitlement and
impose the most severe work requirements in the nation. But it also promised huge expansions of child
care and government jobs for people needing aid, and it extended unprecedented child and health care
subsidies to the entire low-wage working population. This was a radical reform that went far beyond
what either Republicans or Democrats had previously advocated. The spirit of W-2 is socially
conservative in that good behavior is enforced on the dependent, but also liberal in that the enforcing is
done by a generous government using new benefits. The outcome was neither conservative nor liberal in
the traditional sense, but paternalist.
REPUBLICAN MODERATION
The consensual yet radical nature of the Wisconsin outcome is what requires a deeper
exploration. One explanation for it is that the positions conservatives took on welfare in the 1980s were
notably more moderate than in the past, making agreement with liberals easier.
The traditional conservative stance toward welfare had been either to oppose aid to the working-
aged on principle or to reject the extra spending it took to reform welfare. But in the 1980s, conservatives
in both parties tended to attack the abuses in welfare rather than the institution or its cost. Joseph Andrea
tore the skin off the issue by protesting migration, but he claimed that his intent was to rebuild, not
destroy. He wanted to “provide child care, provide a job, to get these people jump-started”; he never
questioned the need for a welfare system.
41 To liberal defenders of aid such as Tony Earl, that sort of
concern, despite the passion it aroused, sounded less “ideological” and more “practical” than the attacks
on AFDC that they had previously battled.
42
Republicans, for their part, were sobered by their earlier defeats over welfare. In reforming the
system, they wanted to appear “less punitive,” lest they ignite another advocate/liberal crusade.
43 Tommy15
Thompson had been an unquestioning conservative during his service in the Assembly, where he rose to
become minority leader. He steadfastly opposed Democratic spending programs, earning the sobriquet
“Dr. No.” But once he entered the governor’s mansion, he took a more moderate line. He did not seek to
cut back public commitment to welfare in any basic way, the goal that Republicans in Congress achieved
with PRWORA. He did not reform welfare mainly to save money, although he did want to cut taxes and
improve the business climate. Nor did he accept radical ideas for privatizing welfare advanced by
conservative intellectuals within Wisconsin, although the administration of W-2 would be partially
privatized.
44
Thompson’s most significant initial proposal was his demand to cut AFDC benefits. That sounds
like a traditional conservative device to reduce spending and taxes, but Thompson justified it as a way of
funding bigger work programs. The point was not to cut back welfare as such but to shift the form of aid
from income maintenance toward employment. The byword was “Cut, but invest.” Democrats could
easily justify that to their consciences and constituents.
45 Thompson also made no further cuts in AFDC
benefits for 10 years, as a sign of “commitment,” Whitburn said, to the humanitarian purposes of
reform.
46 And in 1997 he raised stipends paid to recipients placed in W-2 government jobs by 21 percent,
a step upsetting to some conservatives.
47
Furthermore, Thompson was willing to spend lavishly on the child care, health care, and other
services that Democrats demanded to ease the pain of reform. If the state in fact saved money due to the
caseload decline, that was a windfall. Very seldom during the reform process did Republicans voice
public concern about excessive spending.
48 Instead, it was Democrats who used claims of waste to
criticize the Thompson initiatives, especially Learnfare.
49 Even after W-2 drove the caseload down far
below expectations, Thompson did not pocket the savings. He spoke of using them on other programs
outside welfare, such as housing and environmental cleanup.
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He also compromised with Democrats on operational matters. He postponed the implementation
of Learnfare from 1987 to 1988 when it became clear that the program faced difficulties monitoring
school attendance, especially in Milwaukee.
51 Most of his welfare experiments were piloted outside
Milwaukee, seat of the state’s largest and most entrenched caseload. Only in 1996, with the inauguration
of SSF and PFP, did Milwaukee recipients face unambiguous demands to participate in work programs
and to look for jobs.
All told, the Thompson program might appear conservative. But perceptive Democrats noted
how distant it was from what Republicans had traditionally favored. Tony Earl, whom Thompson
defeated over welfare, remarked ironically that “The kind of proposal, W-2, that Thompson has now
would have been rejected out of hand as too liberal and too expensive by the Republican legislative
leaders of the late 1960s. He’s gone through a real transformation.”
52
DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM OF WELFARE
On the other side, most Democrats were not unwilling reformers. They had their own reasons to
criticize welfare, and they began doing so well before the Republicans forced them to.
In most urban states, Democratic politicians are not uncritical of welfare, but they defend
entitlement, the essence of the unreformed system. Usually, they would like to see more work by the
adult dependent, but they prefer to promote it on a voluntary basis by providing the recipients with more
education, training, child care, or government jobs. They fear to enforce work, that is to demand it as a
condition of aid, because to do so might threaten vulnerable families. Especially, they will not allow
reform at the hands of their Republican opponents, whom they see as uncommitted to the poor, interested
only in cutting back spending and taxes.
In Wisconsin, however, serious criticism of welfare arose in the 1980s on the left as well as on
the right. Initially, the welfare debate erupted within the Democratic party. Conservative Democrats like17
Joe Andrea were the first to attack welfare excesses, in opposition to liberal defenders of welfare. The
conservatives came chiefly from the urban southeastern corner of the state—Kenosha, Racine, and
Milwaukee—the area most exposed to migration from Illinois. The liberals came mostly from Dane
County, around Madison, the state capital, an area hospitable to advocates of feminism,
environmentalism, and other causes of the left. Lee Dreyfuss, the Republican governor prior to Tony
Earl, once referred to Madison as “a city in Wisconsin surrounded by reality.”
53 Andrea “made a career”
of fighting the “Dane County liberals,” he said, leading to “slam-bang debates” in the Democratic
legislative caucus. Indeed, Andrea claimed proudly, “Thompson ran for governor on the Joe Andrea
platform.”
54 The battles softened Democrats up on the welfare issue.
Nor was Democratic criticism confined to the few conservatives in the party. Even Democrats
with a liberal image attacked welfare in terms seldom heard in other urban states. Tom Loftus was
Speaker of the Assembly during Thompson’s early years as governor. He defended generous welfare and
opposed Thompson’s efforts to cut benefits. But at the same time, he called AFDC “a hopeless program”
that was “too broke to be fixed.”
55 He did not flinch from asking blunt questions about how proposed
liberal reforms would solve the personal and family problems of the poor.
56
John Norquist was another liberal who, as an assistant majority leader in the Senate, reacted
favorably to Thompson’s initial proposals. Later, as a highly visible mayor of Milwaukee, he ridiculed
traditional welfare as “a failure” that “ought to be abolished.”
57 His main objection to Work Not Welfare
and W-2 was not that they were too tough on recipients but that they offered them any cash at all (W-2
did permit some limited grants to recipients unable to work in the short run, although these people still
faced required activities). He would have preferred a system in which only jobs were offered.
58 In this, he
reflected the thinking of his adviser, David Riemer, one of several liberal theorists who think replacing
aid with government employment would serve progressive purposes.
5918
Many other Democratic politicians and officials spoke out against welfare on their own initiative,
not simply to blunt Republican sallies. During Thompson’s early reform years, Milwaukee struggled
constantly with general assistance, a locally funded program for single adults and others who did not
quality for federally funded aid such as AFDC. Repeatedly, county executives, welfare administrators,
and city council members from Milwaukee—most of them Democrats—complained of the expense and
abuses of the program. They demanded that Madison take over more of the costs and allow more
stringent work and residency requirements. Such complaints dissociated the Democratic voice from any
simple defense of welfare.
Although Governor Tony Earl tended to defend traditional welfare, this did not stop officials of
his administration from attacking it. Linda Reivitz, his HSS Secretary, declared that “The dysfunctions in
the system, the barriers to employment, are insane.” Peter Tropman, head of welfare planning under
Reivitz, wrote influential papers attacking the old system as permissive. AFDC, he later said, was simply
“out of sync with the experiences of most Americans. What adult people do is work.”
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As these comments suggest, Democrats regarded welfare as a failure because it looked like a bad
deal compared to employment. They were more client-oriented than the Republicans, but they assumed
that the recipients would be better off if they worked, and anything welfare did to block that was
questionable. Why not work, they asked? In this they differed noticeably from liberals in other states and
at the national level, who often view work as a threat to poor families. Yes, work is good in principle,
these liberals say, but only if the effort is voluntary and cushioned with elaborate child care and other
support services. The Wisconsin left simply had higher expectations of the capability they could expect
from their own poor.
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Such sentiments drove Democrats to begin their own efforts to reform welfare well before
Tommy Thompson became governor, when they still controlled the entire state government. In this,
Loftus was a pioneer. He immersed himself in welfare as soon as he entered the Assembly in 1977. He19
agreed with Irwin Garfinkel, an economist at the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of
Wisconsin–Madison, that the best way to reform welfare was to improve child support enforcement so
that more single mothers could support themselves without aid. Working with Garfinkel and Democratic
governors, Loftus fought to raise the level of child support awards and improve their collection, reforms
that became models for similar steps at the national level. Loftus also endorsed Garfinkel’s proposal that
women who were owed child support should have some minimum payment guaranteed by the state,
whether the father paid or not.
62 A plan to test a “child support assurance system” in Wisconsin was
blocked by Thompson in 1987. When Loftus ran against Thompson in 1990, he proposed that this system
replace traditional welfare.
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In 1985, when the welfare migration issue first blew up, the legislature trimmed the usual benefit
increase for AFDC from 3 to 2 percent a year and set up two special committees to study the welfare
problem.
64 Already, both Earl and Loftus had the idea that a freeze or even a reduction in benefits could
be justified in order to expand the work program.
65 Out of the ferment emerged the Work Experience and
Job Training (WEJT) program, the most ambitious attempt to promote work in welfare yet seen. WEJT
aimed to serve the employable AFDC population much more fully than earlier, federally mandated work
programs, such as WIN. Enacted in 1986 and implemented in 1987 in five counties, WEJT was expanded
to much of the state under Thompson. It provided enhanced funding for both training and government
jobs, much as the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program was to do at the national level
under the Family Support Act of 1988. WEJT gave Wisconsin a crucial head start in implementing JOBS
and, thus, in moving toward the more ambitious work requirements of the 1990s.
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Due to these precedents, when Thompson advanced his reform proposals, he encountered a
Democratic leadership that did not reject all change. Not only was Loftus an established innovator, but
his counterpart as floor leader in the Senate, Tim Cullen, agreed to leave elective office to become
Thompson’s chief welfare administrator. Cullen was indispensable in selling the Thompson program to20
his Democratic colleagues.
67 His successor as Senate majority leader, Joe Strohl, invented the idea
behind Two-Tier—paying incoming recipients only the benefit they would have received in their
previous state if it was lower than Wisconsin’s.
68 These were not leaders afraid to grasp the political
nettles of welfare reform.
Nor did Democratic innovation cease with Thompson’s election, even if it was overshadowed by
him. In 1991, in response to Thompson and recent increases in the rolls, Walter Kunicki, the Speaker of
the Assembly, set up a Select Committee on Welfare Review to suggest further changes. It advised a
crackdown on welfare fraud in Milwaukee and recommended milder versions of Two-Tier and
restrictions on general assistance than proposed by Thompson.
69 On several occasions in 1992–93, Mayor
Norquist and Democratic legislators from Milwaukee proposed to replace AFDC with government jobs, a
plan known variously as Wisconsin Works or the Wisconsin Jobs Connection. The proposal became a
competitor to Thompson’s Work Not Welfare, differing from it mainly in having no time limit on aid.
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And after the state decided in 1993 to sunset AFDC and replace it, Democrats set up yet another
legislative panel to decide how to do that.
71 In 1994, the idea of replacing cash with jobs was again
pressed by Chuck Chvala, the Democratic challenger to Thompson’s reelection.
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On occasion, Democrats even claimed that they were more radical reformers than Thompson. In
a floor speech in 1989, Loftus asserted that “AFDC is a Republican program. It is a program that doesn’t
work. It’s an administrative mess. It’s sexist, it’s anti-family, and it is Republican.” He then led
Democrats in the chant, “AFDC is a Republican program.”
73 Since AFDC was created by Franklin
Roosevelt and expanded mostly by liberal Democrats in the 1960s and 1970s, that claim would be
ludicrous in most states. In Wisconsin it merely stretched the facts.
The most surprising episode occurred in 1993, when Rep. Antonio Riley, a black Democrat from
Milwaukee, proposed the total abolition of AFDC. Other Democrats went along. Thompson’s bill to
establish Work Not Welfare was amended to require that AFDC be replaced by some new program,21
vaguely specified, by 1999. Riley did this partly to seize the initiative from the Republicans and partly
because he really believed that welfare had to be totally revamped to emphasize work. His idea was
abetted by Norquist and Riemer.
74 Convinced that abolition was an impractical charade, most of
Thompson’s advisers urged him to veto the provision. For a moment, Democrats really were out in front
of their rivals. But Thompson signed the bill, gambling that he and not Democrats would control the
reworking of welfare. Because he was reelected and Republicans won control of both legislative houses
in the 1994 elections, it was a gamble he won.
But by this point, Democratic thinking on welfare was hardly less radical than that of
Republicans. As noted above, most Democratic legislators ended up voting for W-2. Indeed, some said
that it did not go far enough. Like AFDC, it covered needy families with children. Perhaps, these critics
said, it ought to cover single people and childless couples as well.
75 Democrats had journeyed far from
the world of entitlement.
OUTSIDE GROUPS
Another factor helping to explain the emergence of radical reform was that political forces
outside elective politics did not stop it. Liberal groups lacked a veto over change, and business was
unusually supportive.
In most urban states, minority leaders, advocate groups, and intellectuals are hostile to
conservative welfare reform, and they often have enough influence to derail it. They may not be able to
deliver many votes, but they have enough moral and intellectual authority to intimidate politicians who
might want to question entitlement. It is difficult to contemplate making recipients work or stay in school
in the face of community leaders or commentators who present this as immoral or ignorant, and who have
the ear of the media. In a conservative national climate, these elements have lost the power they had 3022
years ago to drive social policy to the left. But in most large states, they can still prevent it from moving
decisively to the right. Whether even PRWORA has changed this is unclear.
Blacks
Black leaders are often presumed to be natural opponents of reform, because so many blacks rely
on aid. In the Wisconsin legislature, some blacks did challenge Thompson. The most prominent were
Senators Gwendolynne Moore and Gary George, Democrats representing poor areas of Milwaukee. They
played the “race card” as black politicians often do elsewhere in America. Moore characterized
Thompson as a “successful demagogue” who “beat up on people of color” and whose reform amounted
to a “new form of slavery.”
76 George attacked Learnfare as “no different from South Africa.” To him,
Two-Tier implied that “If you’re black, you don’t get fair treatment in America.”
77 As individuals, Moore
and George were widely admired, according to my interviews.
Yet few other blacks or Democrats followed them. A more moderate black figure was Antonio
Riley, the representative who in 1993 spearheaded the abolition of AFDC. Riley sat for the same heavily
welfare-dependent Milwaukee district that Moore occupied before moving up to the Senate. But instead
of defending the system, Riley declared that “Welfare is the jailer of our people.” It caused blacks to be
“written off” by the rest of society. Like many white liberals, Riley assumed that work was better than
welfare, even for needy one-parent families. This reflected his own life experience. He had been on
welfare himself but had also worked from a young age and begun his career in private business. Like
Riemer, he wanted to redesign welfare around work and to “make work pay,” if necessary using
government jobs. He became impatient with Republican “tinkering” and advocated a clean break with the
past. W-2, as it emerged from Thompson’s planners, was too severe for him, and he voted against the
final legislation. But he still thought that “Parts of W-2 are light-years better than the old system,” and he
persisted in believing that it could be improved, for example by permitting more education and training.23
This stance made him, like some other Democrats, more of an ally than an opponent of Thompson.
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More blacks supported his line than that of Moore or George.
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Due to the weakness of black opposition, advocates defending entitlement on racial grounds did
not become the voice of Milwaukee in the welfare debate, as they have in other big cities. Instead, the
city was spoken for mainly by its elected leaders, most of whom, as mentioned earlier, were Democrats
aggrieved by the old aid system. In short, blacks did not set themselves apart from other interests affected
by reform, despite their unusual dependency on aid. They did not force the rest of the polity to treat
welfare as a racial issue. That was why, other than delaying reforms in Milwaukee until late in the
process, the state made no serious concessions to the minority character of welfare in urban areas.
Community Groups
Equally surprising, community organizations opposed to conservative reform had little clout. By
all accounts, they had been very influential during the liberal era of welfare in the 1960s and 1970s. But
they failed to stop Thompson’s train. The main reason, as with blacks, was that their heart was not in it.
Opinion opposed to reform was not silent. Everyone I spoke to in Wisconsin mentioned the
Welfare Warriors, a traditional welfare rights group that demanded that poor single mothers receive
support as a matter of right.
80 Another such group, called Acorn, held demonstrations at welfare centers.
Advocate groups spoke at hearings in the legislature to oppose reform. They held news conferences and
demonstrations at the capitol. But compared to the 1960s, they drew little attention. Politicians heard
them but did not obey. They were more swayed by their own, more moderate opinions and by the
public’s forceful voice favoring change.
Perhaps the weightiest opposition came from the Catholic Church. “Catholic social teaching
holds that the poor, especially children, have a moral claim on the resources of the community,” stated
the Wisconsin Catholic Conference, and conditioning aid on work affronted that. Milwaukee Archbishop
Rembert Weakland attacked W-2 as “a tragedy for the poor and a moral blemish on the earth’s most24
affluent society.” But these words from the hierarchy carried less weight than the actions of radical
priests had done in 1969. Thompson, although a Catholic himself, dismissed the attack, saying Weakland
should “come back to Wisconsin and read his Bible instead of playing piano in New York” (Weakland
was on sabbatical finishing a doctorate in music at Columbia University).
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What undercut the opposition was that few advocates were prepared to defend entitlement. They
questioned the traditional welfare rights position that poor families deserved support even if mothers did
nothing to support themselves. The idea that adult recipients should have to work seemed acceptable to
most of them in principle, although they wanted the terms of work—pay, support services, chances for
better jobs, etc.—to be more generous than the Republicans did. Pat DeLessio, a prominent poverty
lawyer, admitted that “I generally support a principle that requires people to work if it offers them a way
to get training and get out of poverty.”
82 Church groups found the issue of entitlement too sensitive to
take a clear position on it. The upshot was that when the Welfare Warriors demanded that welfare
mothers be guaranteed aid until their children turned 18, other community groups refused to support
them; “shouting erupted,” and the Warriors were left isolated.
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The groups chose to accommodate reform rather than to oppose it root and branch. They
criticized details while tacitly accepting the end of entitlement. They asked, for instance, that recipients
of government jobs provided under W-2 receive regular wages and the earned income tax credit, rather
than just welfare; that more education and training be permitted, rather than immediate work; that time
limits be less rigid if recipients made a good-faith effort to work; that child care meet higher standards;
and that copayments for health and child care be limited. They also criticized the troubled
implementation of SSF, PFP, and W-2 in Milwaukee, which led to the improper sanctioning of many
clients.
84 The Thompson administration reached out to such groups sufficiently to give them a sense that
they had been heard. Thus, like Antonio Riley and most Democrats, they became collaborators in the
reform process more than adversaries.25
One inducement for community groups to cooperate was that W-2 perpetuated the “welfare
industry” often criticized by conservatives. Because the program demanded work rather than simply
denying aid, it required that many services—child care, job placement, government jobs, etc.—be
delivered to a still-large caseload. Money was to be made doing this, and some of the community groups
that might have obstructed reform instead became its contractors. This included the private organizations
that ended up administering W-2 in Milwaukee. In this sense, the potential opposition was coopted. Said
Pat DeLessio, “You’ve got African-American agencies that bought into this program,” such as
Opportunities Industrialization Center and Goodwill Industries. Said Gwendolynne Moore, “This is a
plantation,” and “would-be activists are being paid to be the overseers.”
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Academics
A final source of outside opposition was liberal intellectuals, of which the most important are
poverty experts in the universities. Far more than other elites who grapple with poverty, academics tend
to believe that welfare recipients are helpless victims of the larger society. Much can be done to help
them, they assert, but nothing can be demanded from them, such as work, without risking harm to
families and children. Virtually all academics involved in poverty research have opposed the
conservative brand of welfare reform now dominant.
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These views should have carried special weight in Wisconsin. Not only was it traditionally a
liberal state, but state policymakers deferred to something called the Wisconsin Idea. This was the
conception, going back to the Progressive era, that experts at the state university should collaborate with
elected leaders to craft enlightened social policies. That tradition partly explains why a number of
important social programs were first developed by economists in Wisconsin, and why several, including
workmen’s compensation and unemployment insurance, were first enacted there.
From 1966 onwards, the nation’s principal center of academic inquiry into poverty was the
Institute for Research on Poverty (IRP) at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. There a talented group26
of liberal economists, among them Robert Haveman and Sheldon Danziger, developed approaches,
centered on income transfers and work incentives, to overcoming need. Another IRP economist, Irwin
Garfinkel, developed the ideas for child support that Tom Loftus partially instituted. The period of this
child support collaboration, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was one of the summits of the Wisconsin
Idea.
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To this genteel world of earnest expertise, Tommy Thompson’s election was a rude shock.
Thompson took just the approach to welfare—centering on moral issues and lifestyle—that the
academics, with their antiseptic focus on economics and incentives, disparaged. Ever since then, they
have belittled his achievements. They do not deny the dramatic caseload fall in the state, but, as noted
above, they attributed it to Wisconsin’s good economy and the decline in benefit levels rather than to
Thompson’s welfare experiments. They also produced analyses of the welfare problem that suggested
that few recipients could work and thus that the potential for work-oriented reform was slim.
88 They
would prefer an approach to reform that centered much more on assured child support and “making work
pay”—wage subsidies and guaranteed child and health care.
Yet they were unable to embarrass Thompson. One explanation is that the national debate about
poverty and welfare had already turned rightward. Conservative analysts such as Charles Murray and
Lawrence Mead focused on the lifestyle, not the economics, of poverty. They argued that welfare was
promoting nonwork and family dissolution among the poor, either by the disincentives it set up, or due to
its lack of serious work requirements.
89 The Thompson reformers countered the local intelligentsia by
calling on some of these outside voices. On several occasions in early 1987, Mead, who was visiting at
the University of Wisconsin–Madison, made presentations favoring work requirements to legislative and
welfare department audiences, often alongside Garfinkel, the IRP expert who was the most receptive to
enforcement approaches.
90 This argument for coupling work requirements with welfare had some impact.27
It cut more ice in liberal Wisconsin than the more radical demand by Murray simply to abolish assistance
for the working-aged.
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Thompson also accepted the offer of the Hudson Institute, a moderate think tank from
Indianapolis, to help him plan the redesign of welfare. The president of Hudson, Leslie Lenkowsky, was
himself a recognized welfare expert and a critic of economic approaches to reform.
92 Hudson assembled a
team of experts from Washington and Wisconsin—none of them academics—and this group was chiefly
responsible for the design of W-2. This outside input helps to explain why W-2 represents a fresh
conception and a sharper break with AFDC than the reforms seen in other states. In a way, the Wisconsin
Idea continued, but the expertise politicians relied on no longer came from the University of Wisconsin.
IRP was eclipsed for political reasons, but also because its analysis of poverty was out of date.
The idea that poverty and dependency were rooted in economics or social barriers was a lot more
plausible in the 1960s, when most poor adults worked, than in later decades, when poverty work levels
were much lower, welfare rose, and destitution was more closely linked to behavioral problems,
particularly nonwork and out-of-wedlock pregnancy. Solutions now required the use of social authority
to change lifestyle, so social policy became more administrative. Work requirements in welfare were the
leading instance.
93 That was a change that most of the IRP group could not understand or accept.
Business
Like other conservative forces, business groups oppose large-scale dependency, which they see
as raising the cost of government and undercutting the quality of the labor force. But they often would
prefer simply to cut back benefits and eligibility for aid. They fear that a more complicated, work-
oriented reform would end up costing even more than welfare now does. This view helps explain the
relatively hard-line, aid-cutting approach to reform taken, for example, by Republicans in New York
State. Unfortunately, it is unacceptable to big-city liberals. Much of the paralysis of reform in the larger
states results from this.28
In Wisconsin, by contrast, business has been a constructive force for change. Businessmen in
need of more low-skilled labor have pushed for work-oriented reform in certain key counties, including
Dane and Fond du Lac.
94 At the state level, business groups did not oppose the Thompson reforms on
grounds of cost, even early on before it was clear that the caseload fall would more than finance all the
needed new services.
More unusually, business used its own money to finance experiments in reform, not waiting for
government. The most important of these was New Hope, a job-guarantee program in Milwaukee that ran
from 1992 to 1998 at a cost of over $15 million. Funding came from several governmental and private
sources. These included the Greater Milwaukee Committee, a business group in Milwaukee, and several
prominent executives sat on the New Hope board. The program was liberal in that it tried to overcome
both poverty and dependency by guaranteeing jobs, adequate wages, and child and health care to a
sample of poor and near-poor adults. In this it reflected the thinking of David Riemer and his circle who
favored guaranteed jobs. At the same time, the program was conservative in that participants could claim
the new benefits only if they worked at least 30 hours a week. The program was successfully
implemented and, at this writing, is still being evaluated.
95 Another business coalition took over the
management of a decrepit public housing project in Dane County (Madison), providing intensified
casework and job placement services.
At the very least, this progressive business stance liberated Republican lawmakers to focus on
the welfare problem and on gaining agreement with the left, without fear that big-government measures
would endanger their political base.
A DUTIFUL SOCIETY
The immediate causes of the Wisconsin reform appear to be the moderation of the Republicans,
Democratic willingness to criticize welfare, and the disinclination of outside groups to block change.29
If we seek a still deeper explanation, one factor must be the cohesive and conservative tenor of
Wisconsin society. The values of Americans and their preferred lifestyle do not vary much around the
country. The vast majority of people everywhere want a respectable life that observes middle-class norms
of work, a sober family life, and obedience to the law. But in most urban states, it is also accepted that
cities are less respectable. Efforts during the Progressive era to stamp out urban drunkenness and
prostitution failed. This led to an acceptance in most states that the special disorders of the city—crime,
family problems, and so forth—must be tolerated, if not endorsed.
96
In Wisconsin, however, the tolerance for urban disorder appears weaker than in other big-city
states. This may be true of the entire Midwest, a region often seen as socially more conservative than the
East or West coasts. The reason may be that the immigrants who first settled Wisconsin—heavily
German, Polish, and Scandinavian—are particularly attached to bourgeois values. People I have
interviewed throughout the state simply refuse to accept the extent of social problems they see associated
with welfare. That attitude penetrates even the liberal advocate groups, which then hesitate to defend
entitlement. Even in Milwaukee, social politics is conservative. As Gary George remarked, “Its German-
Polish roots are still dominant. It’s not like New York.”
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Importantly, the revulsion against welfare is shared by Wisconsin’s blacks. Because social
problems are disproportionately linked with blacks nationwide, academics tend to assume that blacks are
more tolerant of those disorders than other racial groups are. That is a reason why whites hesitate to
reform welfare at black expense. But at least in Wisconsin, blacks are not behindhand in criticizing the
old system. Antonio Riley emphasized to me that he decided to take on welfare only after black
constituents of every social position told him of their strong distaste for what AFDC was doing to their
community. They said this because of, and not despite, the fact that the district depended heavily on
welfare. Similarly, Joe Strohl, the Democratic senator who originated Two-Tier, said that he was
converted to reform after older blacks joined whites at meetings in his Racine district in complaining30
about younger blacks moving in from Chicago and going on welfare. “It’s okay for me now to talk about
welfare,” Strohl concluded, “because my black constituents say the same thing as others . . . .”
98 This
hostility to traditional aid extends even to blacks who work in the social service system, who might be
expected to defend it.
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A PROGRESSIVE HERITAGE
A second background force behind the welfare settlement is the Progressive history of Wisconsin
politics. Progressivism was a movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that aspired
to cleanse politics of corruption and base policymaking on reason. The movement was supported by
middle-class and professional people who disliked urban machine politics, often based on immigrant
voters, and wanted to take public administration “out of politics.” Progressivism was a national force,
inspiring early federal efforts to regulate industrialism and, at the state level, electoral primaries and
other reforms that weakened party control over nominations and elections.
Progressivism had a particularly strong influence on Wisconsin. Up through the 1880s, the
state’s politics was dominated by a Republican party suspicious of government and moralistic groups of
reformers, known as mugwumps, who wanted to clean up cities and politics, but on an elitist basis that
did not draw wide support. Politics was factionalized among various business, labor, and ethnic groups.
But in the course of the 1893–97 depression and its aftermath, broader-based demands for public action
against entrenched economic interests arose. The new attitude was that Wisconsinites should work
together to solve common problems through politics, setting aside their suspicions of each other and
government itself. Government was to directly serve “the people,” whom it appealed to over the heads of
all intervening interests. This was the sentiment that Robert M. La Follette molded into a electoral
crusade on the state and then the national scene.
10031
Several legacies resulted, all of them favorable for the state’s recent ability to transform welfare.
First, the state developed a government of unusual capabilities. Progressivism led not only to clean-
politics laws like primaries and the secret ballot but an early development of a civil service and a
progressive income tax. Public service became revered, drawing capable people into administrative
careers. The regime came to embody “a level of expectation in terms of honesty, competence, humane
motivation, and service that is a cut or two above the average among the states.”
101And this competence
was especially displayed in tackling social and economic problems. The state became a laboratory for
new social programs aimed at the insecurities of employment, as mentioned earlier. Later, in the postwar
era, black migration led to racial problems such as school segregation. Policymakers tackled these also
with confidence, because “the people of Wisconsin had come to believe in the power of legislation and in
the idea that good laws enforced by honest and vigorous public servants could resolve virtually any
problem involving discrimination and the exploitation of one group by another.”
102 Later, that same
confidence, equally oblivious to race, would be applied to welfare reform.
A second consequence was that the party system in Wisconsin became oriented to policy issues
rather than conventional partisanship. After World War II, Progressivism as a party splintered in
Wisconsin, and its remnants joined both of the regular parties. A conventional two-party system of
Democrats opposing Republicans reemerged.
103 But both parties were permanently stamped by the
progovernment yet antipartisan spirit of the Progressives. Tom Loftus claimed proudly to be the scion of
“die-hard supporters of . . . La Follette and the Progressive movement.” That made him an “outspoken
liberal,” but at the same time, as Speaker, he was careful to include conservatives as part of his
policymaking team.
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Tommy Thompson, the former “Dr. No,” also claimed to be a Progressive. He did criticize the
original Progressives for being too hostile to business and for overemphasizing “government
responsibility” at the expense of “individual responsibility.” His own populism was directed more against32
the federal government, which in his view unduly constrained what the states could do with money from
Washington.
105 But he kept the Progressive commitment to solving common problems through
government. Unlike many federal Republicans, he did not attack government as such. “I am not an ‘anti-
government’ conservative” or an “ideologue,” he declared. Rather, he governed by “common sense,”
seeking solutions that work and can be explained to people. His “belief in proactive state government”
came of “growing up in a state where . . . Progressive values are unspoken.”
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That meant, especially, that Thompson kept Wisconsin’s signature commitment to an ambitious
social policy. He did not question that government should do many things for the poor. Merely, there was
a need for “redirecting our compassion.” “We were requiring more of welfare recipients, but we were
also being more generous,” he reasoned. “I am a conservative,” he declared, but not in the
antigovernment manner of Edmund Burke, Friedrich Hayek, or the Heritage Foundation. He was willing
to “confront the labels” that said that Republicans could not have social concerns.
107 Hence his calm
acceptance of the big-government dimensions of W-2.
Compared to parties in most other states, Wisconsin’s political parties are not oriented to
organization. They make little attempt to control who enters them; nominations for office are abandoned
to the primary system. The parties are coalitions of able self-starters who get into office on their own,
chiefly because they are interested in policy problems. Issues are taken seriously in their own right, not
only as means of garnering influence.
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Parties still matter in Wisconsin. The parties are careerist, highly competitive, and often vote in
the legislature on party lines. The close division of power in the legislature encourages this. Indeed, the
parties are among the most closely matched in the country, a fact that also promotes a liberal social
policy. At the same time, they are not deeply divided in their beliefs or in the coalitions who support
them.
109 Thus, the parties compete sharply for power, but they also can work together once the elections
are over. The attitude is “live and let live,” Tony Earl said, not “kill or be killed.” Another leader33
remarked, “We do everything in Wisconsin by bipartisan committee.” The most dramatic expression of
this trust was the willingness of Democrats to sunset AFDC in 1993 even though they knew that
Thompson would likely design the replacement. Collaboration between business and government is also
“part of our Progressive tradition,” Thompson wrote; “we share a commitment to an idea that state
government can and should work.”
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The parties focus as much on problem-solving as on partisan maneuver. The welfare battle
generated rivalry, but the larger impulse was to find a true solution to the welfare dilemma. In tackling
that problem, Tom Loftus, whom one associate called a “policy wonk,” announced that he was “after the
next generation, not the next election.”
111 Both parties engaged in serious inquiry, and did not impose
preformed solutions. Most notably, Democratic policymakers did not armor themselves against the
hostile feedback they received about welfare, even though it was anathema to their liberal convictions.
They took it on board. They threw up their hands and admitted that the conservative reformers had a
case. So they accepted the need for change. That willingness to face reality was critical to Wisconsin’s
bipartisan yet radical reform.
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The absence of deeply entrenched partisan positions on policy was essential to tackling welfare,
because the problem crosscuts the normal partisan divide. Democrats tend to argue for more government,
Republicans for less, but successful welfare reform instead requires changing the character of
government. It must change from a mere benefit system to one in which support is coupled with
functioning requirements. That requires Republicans to accept a larger government, and Democrats a
more demanding one, than they do normally. Only a close focus on the problem, rather than on
partisanship, could have led Wisconsin policymakers to their paternalist outcome.
A third legacy was a political culture committed, as the Progressives wished, to collective action
in the general interest. In a famous analysis, Daniel Elazar identified three strands in American political
culture, one or another dominant in each state. The “individualistic” culture, characteristic of the mid-34
Atlantic region, conceives politics mainly in market terms as a way of distributing material advantages to
individuals and interests. This approach tolerates a politics oriented to economic subsidy and payoffs to
politicians and their supporters. The “traditionalistic” culture, dominant in the South, allows government
only a limited role in a social order oriented to the maintenance of racial and class hierarchy. Wisconsin,
rather, represents the “moralistic” culture of New England, the upper Midwest, and parts of the West,
where government is seen as “a positive instrument” for the pursuit of the “general welfare.” In that
tradition, benefits for narrow interests are suspect. Policy is supposed to be based on a general rationale
that leaders sell to an intelligent and undifferentiated public.
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The combination of this moralistic political culture with conservative social values powerfully
equipped Wisconsin for welfare reform. Most states with an ambitious governmental tradition, for
example New York, are too divided socially and too tolerant of big-city social evils to be leaders of
reform.
114 Conversely, most states with a cohesive culture, as in the South, confine their governments to a
limited role. They may implement social programs offered by Washington, but they do not originate
them. In Wisconsin, however, society is conservative, yet government is ambitious. Both the society and
government are strong. Such a state will want to enforce values in welfare, such as work, and it will have
the governmental enterprise to do this.
That strange combination helps explain why, to an outsider, the state can seem like a chameleon,
liberal and conservative at the same time. Wisconsin is above average among the states in the liberalism
of both public opinion and state policy.
115 It is also a state with a strong union tradition that once elected
a Socialist to Congress. Yet it also sent Joe McCarthy to the U.S. Senate and voted for George Wallace in
presidential primaries. Such a state could switch in a decade from one of the most indulgent welfare
systems in America to the most demanding.35
THE TIMING OF REFORM
A final question concerns the timing of reform.
116 Most of the factors that predisposed Wisconsin
to change welfare were long-term. Why did that urge erupt in the mid-1980s, rather than some other
time? The trigger was probably not events outside the state. Serious questioning of welfare did arise in
national politics before it did in Wisconsin, in the 1970s and early 1980s. But federal reforms through the
late 1980s were still very tentative. A serious effort to end entitlement and enforce work did not appear
until the Family Support Act of 1988 and above all PRWORA in 1996. This was well after the onset of
serious change in Wisconsin.
One trigger internal to the state probably was cost. By the 1980s, the rapid growth in welfare
produced fiscal strain. Along with health costs, welfare dominated the state budget, while HSS had
become the largest public agency in the state. Wisconsin was losing jobs. To Tommy Thompson’s eye,
the problem was that welfare recipients were coming to Wisconsin while workers were leaving. Thus,
one of his promises when he first ran for governor in 1986 was to cut taxes and spending.
117 On the other
hand, as noted already, Thompson’s reform did not center on cuts but on shifting spending from income
maintenance to work programs. He often said reform would cost more money rather than less, although
the caseload fall did in fact save money. Thompson did economize on government, but mainly by
squeezing and reorganizing other agencies, not welfare.
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A better argument is that the failures of welfare itself triggered reform. Not only the migration
issue but the inability of good economic conditions to reduce dependency signaled to politicians and
voters alike that something was wrong. Welfare was failing in its mission to help people while returning
them to self-sufficiency. To use John Kingdon’s theory of the agenda, this agreed sense of a problem
then joined with a political opportunity, in the form of Thompson’s election, and with a plausible policy
alternative, in the form of work programs, to create a “policy window.” That juncture explains why, in
the formative period of 1985 to 1987, policy shifted so sharply away from benefit increases and toward36
work enforcement. Alternatively, one can, following Baumgartner and Jones, speak of the slow decay of
the welfare policy subsystem. The generous system that liberals and advocates had built up in the 1960s
and 1970s came under increasing challenge, until finally critics and politicians of all stripes turned on it.
Then a monolith that had seemed unassailable crumbled in only a few years.
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In the end, the old welfare was simply unacceptable to a society and a government deeply
committed to functioning well. It was an insult to Wisconsin’s cohesive social order, and even more to its
masterful regime. Both parties felt this. They reacted not by retreat, but by crafting and launching a still
more ambitious welfare system.37
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